Law and equity
The history of the distinction between law and equity begins in the developing system of law that followed the Norman conquest of England. A plaintiff who wished to have a complaint heard in the king’s courts rather than the local courts had to purchase from the office of the Chancellor a writ, or royal command, that fitted the facts of his case that required the defendant to appear in court. The variety of writs available, and with it the jurisdiction of the king’s courts, expanded until the second half of the thirteenth century when, under pressure from the nobility, the power to issue writs was circumscribed, the jurisdiction of the king’s courts was limited, and the flexibility of the law was diminished. Nevertheless, there was a residual power in the king and his council to do justice in special cases, and he began to refer petitions for redress to the chancellor who, as the chief law member of the council, might give relief as a matter of ‘grace’ or of ‘conscience’ in cases where relief at law was inadequate.
From these beginnings there grew up for non-criminal cases a supplementary system, known as ‘equity,’ in which, by the early fifteenth century, justice was administered through a separate court, the Court of Chancery. The law courts were forced to accept this system after a notorious struggle that ended in the early seventeenth century. Among the distinctive features of a suit in equity as opposed to an action at law were the absence of a jury, a more flexible procedure, and a wider scope of review on appeal. While the law courts were generally restricted to the award of money damages as relief, equity operated on the person of the defendant and the court could, for example, issue an injunction, forbidding specified acts in order to prevent further injury, or it could decree specific performance, ordering performance of an obligation. A defendant who disobeyed could be punished by fine or imprisonment for contempt of court until compliance. But because these equitable remedies were considered to be extraordinary, they were only available where the remedy at law could be shown to be inadequate, and money damages remained the standard kind of relief.
Equity also came to differ from law in substance as well as procedure, as may be seen from one of its most important creations, the trust. The trust concept grew out of the conveyance of property by the owner (the settlor) to a transferee (the trustee), who was to hold it for the benefit of another (the beneficiary). For the transaction to succeed, some means had to be found to compel the trustee to comply with the terms of the trust. Since equity acted upon the person, it was able to enforce the trustee’s fiduciary duties by its sanctions of fine and imprisonment while at the same time recognizing the legal ownership of the trustee. Out of the beneficiary’s equitable rights came the concept of equitable, as distinguished from legal, ownership. Around this new institution a whole new branch of substantive law was to grow. Today the express trust is widely used in the United States for both real and personal property, especially income-producing securities, and trust administration has become a task for professionals with the resultant rise of corporate trustees: private express trusts are relied upon to dispose of most substantial family wealth at death; charitable express trusts are used to create large philanthropic foundations. The trust concept has also proved a useful tool in the hands of the courts: resulting trusts, inferred from the circumstances, are used to carry out the presumed intentions of parties to transactions in property; and constructive trusts, implied as a matter of law, have become an essential device for avoiding unjust enrichment in cases of fraud and mistake.
It is therefore important to realize that ‘equity’ is not a synonym for ‘general fairness’ or ‘natural justice.’ It refers instead to a particular body of rules that originated in a special system of courts. However, these rules have to a considerable extent been assimilated into the appropriate categories of law and are now often regarded as part, for example, of property or contract law. One result has been that most law schools no longer give a separate course in equity, though the subject may be dealt with as part of a broader course in remedies. It is true in the United States, as in England, that if we were to inquire what it is that all these rules have in common and what it is that marks them off from all other rules administered by the courts, we should by way of answer find nothing but this, that these rules were until lately administered, and administered only, by the courts of equity. Certainly for the purposes of this book, the distinction between law and equity is not a helpful basis for classification.
注释:
equity n. 衡平法
Chancellor n. 御前大臣,掌玺大臣,大法官
writ n. 令状
circumscribe v. 限制
flexibility n. 灵活性
diminish v. 减少,消退
residual adj. 剩余的,残留的
council n. 谘议会;枢密院
redress n. 赔偿,救济
supplementary adj. 补充性的
Court of Chancery 大法官法院,衡平法院
injunction n. 禁制令
decree v. 判决
specific performance 特定履行,强制履行
extraordinary adj. 特别的,非常规的
conveyance n. (不动产)转让
settlor n. 托管人,让与人
transferee n. 受让人
trustee n. 受托人
beneficiary n. 受益人
express trust 书面信托
income-producing security 收益证券
charitable adj. 仁慈的,为慈善事业的
philanthropic adj. 博爱的
resulting trust 归复信托
constructive trust 推定信托
enrichment n. 发财致富
synonym n. 同义词
natural justice 自然正义
assimilate v. 吸收
译文:
普通法和衡平法区别发展的历史始于诺曼征服之后的法律制度的发展。如果一名原告不愿在地方法员提起诉讼而是想在王室法员提起诉讼,他就必须从文秘署购买相应的令状或者皇室命令,以此要求被告出席法庭审理。可供选择的令状的种类以及与之有关的王室法院的管辖权一直得到增长和扩大,直到13世纪下半叶,在贵族的压力下,签发令状的权力遭到限制,王室法庭的管辖权也遭到限制,同时法律的灵活性消亡了。但是,国王和他的谘议会仍在特别案件的审判方面保留了残留的权力,国王开始把赔偿申请交给御前大臣来处理,作为谘议会中主要法律事务成员,他能够在当案件不能在法律上得到相应救济的时候,给予‘恩典的’或者‘良心的’救济。
从这些开端开始发展,一种补充性的制度出现了,它被用来处理非刑事案件,即‘衡平法’,15世纪早期,根据这种制度,审判是由一个独立的法庭进行的,被称为衡平法院。在臭名昭著的结束于17世纪早期的斗争之后,普通法法院被迫接受这个制度。衡平法中的民事诉讼和普通法中的民事诉讼最明显的区分特征就是衡平法中没有陪审团,它是一个更加灵活的程序,有更广泛的上诉的余地。普通法法院一般只能判决金钱赔偿作为救济方式,衡平法则是对被告的人身起作用。衡平法院可以,例如,签发禁制令,禁止某些特定的行为以防止进一步的伤害行为,或者它可以判决特定履行,命令履行某项义务。被告如果不遵守判决,将会被处以罚金或因蔑视法庭而被判处入狱,直到其服从为止。但是因为衡平救济被认为是一种特别救济,所以只有在普通法救济不足的时候才能适用,而救济的标准方式仍然是金钱给付的损害赔偿。
除了内容上的不同,衡平法与普通法在程序上也存在差异,信托就是其中之一。信托是从财产转让发展起来的,在这个过程中,所有者(财产让与人)把财产交给受让人(保管人),后者为了第三者的利益(受益人)持有该财产。为了保证该交易的成功,就需要一些方法迫使受托人遵守信托的条款。因为衡平法可以直接作用于人,它能够以罚金和监禁的惩罚迫使受托人履行自己的信托义务,同时,能够承认受托人的合法的所有权。随着受益人衡平法上的权利而来的是作为于普通法相区分的衡平法上的所有权。围绕着这个崭新的制度,一个全新的实体法分支开始发展起来。今天,书面信托已经被广泛地应用于美国地不动产以及个人财产,特别是收益证券。信托管理已经变成一个职业工作伴之而来地是托管人人数的增长。私人书面信托主要是依赖于对死者身后的家庭实有财产的进行处理。慈善书面信托是用来建立大的慈善基金。信托的概念也给被证实是法庭所能掌握的一个有用的工具:归复信托,产生于财产转让,被用来实现财产交易中的交易方假定的目的。推定信托,作为普通法默认的制度,已经成为一种在欺诈和过失案件中防止不当得利的基本工具。
因此,认识到衡平法不仅仅是‘一般公平’或者‘自然正义’的同义词是很重要的。 它是一个滋生于一个特殊的法院系统规则的实体。但是,这些规则被普通法的一种合适的法律类别所吸收,现在经常被认为是财产法或者合同法的一部分。
如此导致的结果是大多数的法学院不再开设一种独立的衡平法课程,尽管这个主题作为赔偿课程的一部分仍然会提到。在美国,和英格兰一样,如果被问及一切的衡平法规则有什么共同点和是什么把它们同我们普通法庭执行的所有规则相区别,那么除了一点再没有其他的了,这就是此类规则直到最近才获得执行,而且只有通过衡平法院来执行。当然从本书的目的来说,普通法和衡平法的区别并不是一个有实际意义的分类依据。
知识链接:
大法官法院的历史发展
在诺曼和安茹时期,大法官署是一种秘书机构,大法官(御前大臣)是国家所有部门的秘书长,同御前会议的关系十分密切。后来大法官署逐步分离,形成了诸如财政署那样的独立机构。后来掌管御玺的御前大臣开始雇佣自己的职员,其收入则由财政署进行审计。尽管御前大臣仍然是一名随同国王的官员,但却拥有了自己完全独立的职员,由此发展出一种独立的部门传统。
但御前大臣命中注定不仅仅作为一个部门首长而存在,因为他的手中握有御玺,掌玺大臣的地位使他成为英格兰司法系统的首脑,成为政制的法律中心。
英格兰的法律体系成为一种王室司法体系,而要将这种王室司法引入实践、开始诉讼则必须通过御前大臣加盖御玺的原始令状,所以有人称大法官署为“一切原始令状的作坊和商铺”。同样的,一切重要的政府施政行为也都必须在文书上加盖御玺。如此就必须要通过御前大臣的审查,而针对普通法法官的上诉、请愿也迟早要通过御前大臣。于是御前大臣和大法官署就同国家政制的各个部门都发生了直接的联系,其职权范围广、种类多。法律家和政治家们都承认御玺几乎拥有无上的权力,不服从就构成叛逆,甚至加盖御玺的文件与其实际意图不符,也同样有效。
至于御前大臣和大法官署同国家司法体系的关系,在两方面关系很密切,也由此发展出了大法官和大法官法院的司法权力。
(1)御前大臣负责签署原始令状
十二世纪及十三世纪初授予御前大臣签发令状的权力,可以对王室法院进行有力的控制。由此令状的数量不断增长,但是地方上的势力总是试图加以限制。十三、十四世纪时议会力量增长,使得立法权力只能在议会中被授予,于是令状系统就渐渐遭到废弃,或者通过新的立法加以界定。同时,威斯敏斯特第二法令也授权御前大臣可以在必要时对令状进行轻微的修正,实践中御前大臣也确实有很多这样的做法,由此也可以解释御前大臣最后成为普通法无救济时行使正义的大法官了,后来便渐次发展出衡平正义的观念。但是,签发令状的权力仍然受到议会和普通法法院的有力限制,基本上只限于国王有直接利益的事项。后来这种权力最终被认为是大法官的一种普通法管辖权,而同其衡平管辖权截然分开——衡平管辖权则是与御前大臣(大法官署)同国王枢密院的亲密关系联结在一起的。
(2)御前大臣和大法官署同国王枢密院的密切联系
枢密院是十二世纪御前会议的直系后裔,普通法法院的出现分化了御前会议的大部分司法权力,议会的兴起和增强也分化了它的其他一些司法权力和立法权,但枢密院仍然作为行政机关而存在,享有同国王密切联系的司法权力。而且,这种司法权力一直是一种特别权力,凌驾于一般的法律之上(above and beyond the ordinary law)。十二世纪时,“一般法律”是指地方法院实施的习惯法,到十四世纪则是指普通法法院实施的法律。在十四、十五世纪的发展过程中,看来有必要设立一种法院以缓和普通法的刚性(包括此前习惯法的形式主义),而御前大臣和大法官署始终同国王和枢密院保持着密切的联系,尽管中世纪时大法官署开始倾向于成为一个独立的国家机关,但这种密切的联系始终没有被削弱。所以,当财政署和王座法院被吸收入普通法系统时,大法官署始终保持了其独立性,由此成为普通法系统之外行使司法权的主要机构。最终作为大臣的御前大臣也就转变为大法官了(当然,在英语中的称谓并没有丝毫的变化,仍然称为Chancellor,文秘署和大法官廷都称为Chancery,但在中文译名上应当有所区别,以显示这一职位在性质上的微妙变化)。
到十四世纪后期,大法官和大法官署拥有非常重要的司法职能,审理由枢密院或议会转来的案件,或者依照枢密院的惯常权力审理案件。但此时大法官仍然尚未获得独立的地位,而是作为枢密院的代表审理案件,许多当时的记录将其视为枢密院审理案件,并且同时有许多枢密院其他成员在场,而涉及普通法的案件则往往由高级律师和法官提出建议处理。一直到1474年才出现了大法官以自己独立的权力审判的记录,此后便很快固定下来,大法官和大法官法院(court of Chancery)成为独立于枢密院行使司法权力的法院。
一日一句:
Every unjust decision is a reproach to the law or the judge who administers it. If the law should be in danger of doing injustice, then equity should be called in to remedy it. Equity was introduced to mitigate the rigour of the law. —— Lord Denning M.R., Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No. 2), [1974] 1 Ch. 269
每一个不公正的判决都是对于法律以及负责实施法律的法官的谴责。如果法律处于可能要为不正义的危险之中,那么就应该让衡平法来进行救济。衡平法就是被用来缓解法律的刚性。——丹宁勋爵,上诉法院院长,Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No. 2), [1974] 1 Ch. 269
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